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THE MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL: A NEGLECTED
SAFEGUARD*
TiE Anglo-American trial has traditionally been an adversary proceeding.
A fundamental characteristic of such a trial is that the party who brings the
action has the initial burden of producing evidence in support of his claim.,
A defendant--civil or criminal-need not offer a defense until this burden
has been satisfied. Once the party who has brought the action produces
sufficient evidence to carry his case to the jury, however, a defendant remains
mute at his peril since a verdict may now be returned against him.2 Theoreti-
cally, a defendant can test the sufficiency of the evidence at the close of his
opponent's case-in-chief by a motion for directed verdict in a civil trial or by
a motion for acquittal in a criminal trial.3 If at this time the evidence is
insufficient, the court is supposed to terminate the action in favor of the de-
fendant.4 In practice, however, such a motion is often denied despite the
insufficiency of the evidence.
The motion for acquittal in the criminal trial and its civil counterpart, the
motion for directed verdict, are the products of an evolutionary trend which
has increased the supervisory role of the judge over the trial process. The
demurrer to the evidence was the first method by which a judge could with-
draw a civil case from the jury and decide it with finality; both parties, how-
ever, had to consent to the withdrawal.5 The common law motion for non-suit
*An earlier version of this Comment was submitted in satisfaction of the writing
requirement of the Yale Law School's Divisional Program, Procedure and Advocacy
Division, 1960-1961. The Law Journal wishes to thank Professor Abraham S. Goldstein
for bringing this paper to the Editors' attention.
1. 9 XVIGzoRE, EViDENcE § 2511 (3d ed. 1940). See generally id. §§ 2487, 2494.
2. Id. § 2487.
3. The term "motion for acquittal" is used here to include all devices with the same
purpose and the same effect. E.g., FED. R. Cvunt. P. 29 (motion for judgment of acquittal) ;
ARiz. R. Clm. P. 270 (motion for directed verdict) ; State v. Bonomo, 173 Kan. 675, 250
P.2d 833 (1952) (demurrer to the evidence) ; Shiflett v. State, 262 Ala. 337, 78 So. 2d 805
(1955) (motion to exclude the evidence).
4. The question of sufficiency is most important when the state's case rests in part on
circumstancial evidence since, where there is direct testimony of a fact, the jury is the sole
judge of credibility unless the testimony is "inherently improbable," People v. Carvalho,
112 Cal. App. 2d 482, 489, 246 P.2d 950, 955 (1952), or "incredible as a matter of law," State
v. Merryman, 79 Ariz. 73, 283 P.2d 239 (1955).
5. The earliest reported use of the demurrer to the evidence was Tikford v. Caldwell,
Y.B. 34 Hen. VI, 36, pl. 7 (1456), in THAYER, CASES ON EVIDENCE 201 (2d ed. 1900). The
demurrer was a risky tool because, where denied, judgment was ordered against the moving
party. By the end of the 18th century the demurring party had to list in writing every fact
admitted. Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. B1. 187, 126 Eng. Rep. 499 (1793). For a detailed historical
analysis, see King, Trial Practice-Demurrer Upon Evidence as a Device for Taking a
Case from the Jtry, 44 MIcH. L. REv. 468 (1945) ; THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON
EVIDEN cE 234-39 (1898).
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came later and as adopted in the United States it empowered the judge to
dismiss an action on the motion of the defendant alone but left the plaintiff
free to reinstitute his suit.6 In the 19th century judges began to utilize the
directed verdict in civil cases, granting final judgment on the motion of the
defendant when the proponent's case failed the test of sufficiency. 7 The motion
for judgment of acquittal in criminal cases came still later and was probably
influenced by these earlier developments in the civil trial.8
In the criminal trial the efficacy of the defendant's motion for acquittal at
the close of the prosecution's case is severely limited by the refusal of almost
all appellate courts to review denial of the motion if the defendant later
introduced evidence on his own behalf.9 The accused who chooses to present
a defense may of course renew his motion for acquittal after both sides have
rested.'0 At that time, however, the trial and appellate courts will consider
all the evidence of guilt in ruling on the motion, including any incriminating
facts supplied by the defendant himself." The courts hold that an accused who
presents a defense has "waived" his right to a review of the sufficiency of the
6. RESTATEMENTS, JUDGMENTS § 53 (1942); FIELD & KAPLAN, MATERIALS ON CIVIL
PRocEDuRE 573 (1953). See Annot., 79 A.L.R. 688 (1932) (conditions under which plaintiff
can take voluntary non-suit).
7. [T]he defendant's counsel requested the court to instruct the jury, "that, if the
evidence is believed by the jury to be true, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover."
This instruction was given by the court... [T]he practice of granting an instruction
like the present, which makes it imperative upon the jury to find a verdict for the
defendant... has in many States superseded the ancient practice of a demurrer to
evidence.
Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 316, 372-73 (1850).
8. The early cases directing acquittal did so without citing any authority but apparently
assumed such power was inherent in the judge's role as presiding officer. See United States
v. Fullerton, 25 Fed. Cas. 1225 (No. 15176) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870); Commonwealth v.
Merrill, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 415, 417-18 (1860) ; see also United States v. Anthony, 24 Fed.
Cas. 829 (No. 14459) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873) which relied on Fullerton, stpra, in directing
the jury to convict the defendant. But see Annot., 72 A.L.R. 899 (1931) (so long as accused
pleads "not guilty" he is entitled to have the prosecutor's case submitted to the jury).
9. See, e.g., Corbin v. United States, 253 F.2d 646 (10th Cir. 1958) ; United States v.
Aman, 210 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Leeby v. United States, 192 F.2d 331 (8th Cir. 1951) ;
United States v. Goldstein, 168 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Mobley v. State, 227 Ind. 335,
85 N.E.2d 489 (1949); State v. Johnson, 145 Me. 30, 71 A.2d 316 (1950); State v.
Roseberry, 283 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955); State v. Dildine, 41 Wash. 2d 614, 250
P.2d 951 (1952) ; Annot., 17 A.L.R. 910, 925 (1922). Sometimes civil and criminal cases
are cited interchangeably in support of the waiver doctrine. See Rosenbloom v. United
States, 259 F.2d 500, 502 (8th Cir. 1958).
10. E.g., FED. R. Cam. P. 29(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.08 (1944); MD. R. PROC.
738 (1958).
11. Rain v. State, 15 Ariz. 125, 133, 137 Pac. 550 (1913) ("Having voluntarily proceeded
with the trial of the case ... we must consider the whole case . . . ") (emphasis added) ;
accord, T'Kach v. United States, 242 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1957) ; United States v. Goldstein,
168 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1948) ; State v. Howe, 69 Ariz. 199, 211 P.2d 467 (1949) ; Orange v.
Commonwealth, 191 Va. 423, 61 S.E.2d 267 (1950).
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prosecutor's case as it stood when the original motion was made.12 The waiver
doctrine thus imposes an enormous responsibility on defense counsel whose
motion is denied. In order to present his client's evidence to the jury he
must waive what may be a legal ground for reversal. But if he rests his case, his
client is almost certain to be convicted by the jury,'3 so that everything will
rest on the appeal. Obviously, a doctrine which imposes this kind of responsi-
bility on the defense lawyer maximizes the role of counsel and prejudices the
defendant who is badly represented.
Though appellate courts are insulated from some of the pressures affecting
trial judges, 14 a convicted defendant can rarely be certain of appellate reversal.
Not only will the court construe the evidence in favor of the verdict,' 5 but
the standard of sufficiency is unsettled in some jurisdictions 16 and any stand-
ard is broad enough to permit contrary decisions on identical facts.17 If the
12. Wright v. State, 212 Miss. 491, 493, 54 So. 2d 735, 736 (1951) ("he waived any
error . . . [in the denial of his motion] by putting on his proof.") ; accord, Maulding v.
United States, 257 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1958) ; McDonough v. United States, 248 F.2d 725
(8th Cir. 1957) ; United States v. Goldstein, 168 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1948).
13. A noted defense attorney states:
I think that today it has become a fact that unless a defendant takes the stand in a
criminal case in his own defense his chances for acquittal are negligible.
Williams, The Trial of a Criminal Case, 29 N.Y.B.A. BULL. 36, 41 (1957).
Williams asserts that over 99% of the criminal defendants in the federal courts who do
not testify are convicted in jury trials. Id. at 42.
14. The appellate court is not subject to the community passions of a trial court nor
does it work as closely with the prosecutor. For a discussion of the role the press can play
in molding community responses to a trial, see Douglas, The Public Trial and a Free Press,
46 A.B.A.J. 840 (1960).
15. See, e.g., Goodman v. United States, 273 F.2d 853, 855 (8th Cir. 1960) ; United
States v. Bucciferro, 274 F.2d 540, 541 (7th Cir. 1960) ; United States v. Tutino, 269 F.2d
488, 490 (2d Cir. 1959) ; State v, Milton, 85 Ariz. 69, 72, 331 P.2d 846, 848 (1958).
16. Compare People v. Huizenga, 34 Cal. 2d 669, 675-76, 213 P.2d 710, 713-14 (1950),
with People v. McCree, 128 Cal. App. 2d 196, 201, 275 P.2d 95, 99 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954). See
Note, Sufflciency of Circumstantial Evidence in a Criminal Case, 55 COLUm. L. REv. 549,
550 n,9 (1955), which collects cases laying down conflicting tests within the same jurisdic-
tion.
17. The standard to be used in measuring the prosecutor's case varies between jurisdic-
tions. The strictest and most common standard is that formulated in Isbell v. United States,
227 Fed. 788, 792 (8th Cir. 1915), which requires the prosecution to negate "every other
hypothesis but that of guilt." The most lenient standard is that promulgated by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit which requires only that there be "substantial evidence"
of each element of the offense. See United States v. Sherman, 171 F.2d 619, 621 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 931 (1949); United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 504-05
(2d Cir. 1944) ; United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 322
U.S. 726 (1944). Although it is difficult to distinguish between various formulations of
the same standard and different standards, a third test lying somewhere between the
Second Circuit and Isbell formulas was articulated in Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d
229, 232 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947), which requires the court to acquit
if "reasonable juryman must necessarily have [a reasonable doubt]." See A. Goldstein,
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defendant elects to present his defense, on the other hand, he thereby waives
any error in the denial of his motion and runs the risk of supplying evidence
or innuendo that will contribute to his conviction by the jury. Incriminating
evidence which may be elicited from a defense witness will be more damage-
ing than similar evidence introduced by the prosecution ;"' impeachment of
his witnesses may reflect adversely on the defendant ;1 his own testimony may
be unpersuasive because of the emotional strain under which it is given ;20
any inconsistent or demonstrably false statement made by the defendant may
be considered for impeachment purposes and sometimes as substantive evi-
dence pointing to consciousness of guilt ;21 and if the defendant has a criminal
record, that fact will inevitably be disclosed if he takes the stand.2 2 Evidence
supplied by the defense may also lead an appellate court to sustain the con-
The State and The Accused: Balance of Advantage in Crininal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J.
1149, 1160-61 (1960), contrasting results on nearly identical facts where different tests were
applied.
18. See, e.g., I. GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TECHNIqUE § 546 (1935):
Admissions secured from the lips of opponent's client and his witnesses ordinarily
have greater weight with the jury than does the testimony of one's own witnesses.
19. Cf. Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U. C.
L. REv. 69, 79 (1936):
Under the adversary system ... it is somewhat natural to regard the witnesses as
belonging to the party who calls them .... Consistent with this scheme is the thought
that a party vouches for the persons he presents as witnesses....
20. A person accused of crime may become confused and frightened under cross-
examination. His memory may be faulty with respect to unanticipated collateral matter.
He may be subject to impeachment for prior conviction of a felony. Other aspects of his
behavior may be unfavorable if revealed. See Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 24 U. CH. L. REv. 472, 487 (1957) ; see Hutchins
& Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-Consciousness of Guilt, 77 U.
PA. L. REv. 725, 734-40 (1929), where it is pointed out that the presence of authority quite
often produces an appearance of guilt which has no relation to the crime charged but is
rather a manifestation of a remote, imagined or entirely unconscious guilty feeling.
21. See Andrews v. United States, 157 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
821 (1947) ; People v. Tolson, 109 Cal. App. 2d 579, 241 P.2d 32 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952) ;
People v. Arnold, 43 Mich. 303, 5 N.W. 385 (1880). For other conduct which may be
used to show consciousness of guilt, see generally Hutchins & Slesinger, note 20 supra;
2 WiaMona, EvIDENcE §§ 273-76 (3d ed. 1940).
22. Evidence of prior convictions are inadmissible although there are exceptions where
the other crimes show motive, infent, a common plan, knowledge or the identity of the
accused. See, e.g., People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901) ; but once the ac-
cused testifies, prior convictions are freely admissible for impeachment purposes even when
the prior crime was remote in time and nature, see People v. Buford, 396 Ill. 158, 71 N.E.2d
340 (1947), where a conviction for grand larceny under another name 15 years previously in
another state was used to impeach the defendant in a trial for assault with a deadly weapon.
The collateral issues and confusion which is likely to result from such impeachment is detail-
ed in MORGAN, MAGUIRE & WEINSTEIN, CASES ON EVIDENCE 291-94 (4th ed. 1957). UNIvolu
RUL-E OF EViDENCE 21 would allow prior convictions to be used for impeachment only when




viction even though it would have reversed the denial of the motion for
acquittal if the defendant had rested at the close of the state's case.
23
The defendant is most prejudiced by the waiver doctrine when evidence
essential to his defense also plugs a gap in the prosecution's case-in-chief. This
situation was exemplified by People v. Corbisiero.2' Defendant was indicted
for murder after a neighbor died of a knife wound in front of the defendant's
pastry shop. The prosecution proved the cause of death but failed to link the
defendant to the crime. Defendant moved for acquittal at the close of the
prosecution's case. The motion was denied. He then presented evidence of self-
defense. In so doing, however, his key witness not only linked the defendant to
the crime but testified that the defendant actually stabbed the decedent. On
appeal from the defendant's conviction, the prosecutor conceded that the
evidence was insufficient at the close of his case-in-chief but urged the ap-
pellate court to consider the defendant's evidence to supply the deficiency. 25
The court felt itself bound by the waiver doctrine. Therefore, in passing on
the motion it had to consider all the evidence including that "disclosed by an
accused in making his defense."'2 6 Nevertheless it reversed the conviction,
saying that it would not "contrive a case against [the accused]. '"27 The
Corbisiero court was faced with this problem: a defense witness had supplied
the missing link in the prosecution's case; he had also given exculpatory
testimony, the credibility of which was exclusively a matter for jury deter-
mination.2 8 If the waiver doctrine was inapplicable, the conviction would
have to be reversed since there was insufficient evidence of guilt at the close
of the prosecution's case-in-chief. Applying the waiver doctrine as the Cor-
bisiero court said it would, however, there is absolutely no ground for reversal
since there is sufficient evidence of guilt in the whole record and the excul-
patory testimony was rejected by the jury. The court was able to reverse the
conviction in this case only by writing an intellectually dishonest opinion which
failed to resolve the problem posed.
The defendant may be prejudiced by an erroneous denial of his motion for
acquittal even though his evidence will not fill a total void in the state's case.
In the burglary case of Reynolds v. State,29 aside from the testimony of an
accomplice which had to be corroborated,30 the defendant was linked to the
23. See notes 11 & 12 mipra.
24. 290 N.Y. 191, 48 N.E.2d 481 (1943).
25. Id. at 193-94; 48 N.E2d at 482.
26. Id. at 194, 48 N.E2d at 482.
27. Ibid.
28. See note 4 .supra.
29. 14 Ariz. 302, 127 Pac. .731 (1912).
30. A conviction shall not be had on the testimony of an accomplice unless the ac-
complice is corroborated by other evidence which, in itself and without aid of the
testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of
the offense. The corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of
the offense or the circumstances thereof.
Ariz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-136 (1956).
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burglary only by evidence that men of his general description were seen
loitering around the premises in question prior to the crime. Defendant moved
for acquittal at the conclusion of the prosecution's case. The motion was
denied. The defendant decided to rest without introducing evidence, thereby
preserving his right to question on appeal the sufficiency of the prosecution's
case. His conviction was reversed. Suppose, however, that the jurisdiction was
one which adhered to the "substantial evidence" test,8 ' that even under that
test the state's case-in-chief was inadequate, but that the defendant had offered
evidence in his own defense instead of resting on his motion for acquittal.
Suppose further that direct and cross-examination elicited from his witnesses
evidence that (1) the defendant could not account for his activities on the night
of the burglary, (2) he lived or worked near the scene of the crime and passed
by it frequently, (3) he frequently associated with known felons and (4) he
had himself been convicted of burglary on two previous occasions. Even when
all this evidence is added to the state's case-in-chief it might not exclude every
reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt,32 but it might justify denial of a
motion for acquittal by a court following the substantial evidence test.
The waiver doctrine also undermines long-established rules requiring the
state to introduce extrinsic evidence "corroborating" any confession,33 accom-
plice testimony, 34 or possession evidence (in a burglary case) 3 essential to
31. See, e.g, United States v. Andolschek, 142 F2d 503, 505 (2d Cir. 1944) ("The
accused at bar do not argue that the evidence was not strong enough to support a verdict
in a civil case, and it certainly was; that being true, our review ends") ; and see note 17
supra.
32. This test is used by the majority of courts in circumstantial evidence cases. See,
e.g., Isbell v. United States, 227 Fed. 788, 792 (8th Cir. 1915). See A. Goldstein, The State
and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1157-58
(1960).
33. The purpose of corroborating a confession is to prevent "errors in convictions
based upon untrue confessions alone," [citing case] ; its foundation lies in a long
history of judicial experience with confessions . . . Confessions may be unreliable
because they are coerced or induced, and although separate doctrines exclude in-
voluntary confessions from consideration by the jury [citing cases] further caution
is warranted because the accused may be unable to establish the involuntary nature
of his statements. Moreover, though a statement may not be "involuntary" within
the meaning of this exclusionary rule, still its reliability may be suspect if it is
extracted from one under the pressure of police investigation-whose words may
reflect the strain and confusion attending his predicament. ...
Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954).
Confessions must be corroborated in an overwhelming majority of state courts as well.
See 7 WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2070-72 (3d ed. 1940) ; Annot., 127 A.L.R. 1130 (1940).
34. About half of the states require by statute that the testimony of an accomplice be
corroborated. Cases and statutes are collected in 7 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2056 n.10 (Supp.
1959).
35. See, e.g., People v. Citrino, 46 Cal. 2d 284, 288, 294 P.2d 32, 35 (1956) ("Possession
alone of property stolen in a burglary is not of itself sufficient to sustain the possessor's
conviction of that burglary. There must be corroborating evidence of acts, conduct, or
declarations of the accused tending to show guilt.").
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its case. In State v. Meadows,3 6 for example, the state built a case of arson-
murder around the defendant's confession and rested without establishing the
incendiary origin of the fire by extrinsic evidence. Thus at the close of the
prosecution's case under applicable state law 1) the confession should not
have been considered since it was uncorroborated and 2) even if the con-
fession was considered, the defendant should have been acquitted because the
corpus delicti had not been independently established.37 The defendant, how-
ever, took the stand after his motion for judgment of acquittal was erroneously
denied. In upholding his conviction on appeal, the Missouri court sanctioned
the retroactive use of the defendant's testimony to corroborate the confession
and independently to establish the corpus delicti.38 In Washington v. Arizo-
na 3 0 the prosecution failed to present any independent evidence linking the
defendant to the crime by way of corroborating the testimony of an alleged
accomplice who was the only prosecution witness to incriminate the accused.
On appeal, however, it was held that the defendant had supplied the necessary
corroboration by admitting that he owned a coat which had been found at the
scene of the crime.40 Here again, retroactive application of defense testimony
was allowed to emasculate the corroboration requirement.
The combination of the waiver doctrine and judicial reluctance to grant
motions of acquittal before the defense has been presented is very likely to
prove extremely prejudicial when there are one or more co-defendants. Con-
sider the classic case where "two sisters were indicted for murder, and there
was evidence that they had both been in the room at the time the murder of
the boy was committed; but the prosecution could not show that sister A had
committed the offense or that sister B had committed the offense."'4' On the
basis of such evidence a prosecutor should not survive a motion for acquittal.
42
If the motion was erroneously denied and both defendants testified, however,
they might turn on one another so that at the close of their testimony the jury
would have evidence on which to convict either or both. A leading English
36. 330 Mo. 1020,51 S.W.2d 1033 (1932).
37. The court accepted the defendant's contention that proof of the incendiary origin of
the fire was an element of the corpus delicti which had to be established independently of
the confession. Id. at 1025-26, 51 S.W.2d at 1036.
38. We need not consider whether or not the state had made a sufficient showing of
the corpus delicti when it closed its case in chief. Since defendant did not stand
upon his demurrer offered at the close of the state's evidence, but offered evidence
himself... we see no reason why the rule that applies generally should not be applied
here, viz., that the sufficiency of the evidence in the case, including the testimony
of the defendant if that or other evidence offered by him aids or supplies deficiencies
in the case made by the state in its evidence.
Id. at 1026, 51 S.W.2d at 1036.
39. 46 Ariz. 446,52 P.2d476 (1935).
40. Id. at 450, 52 P.2d at 478.
41. Regina v. Abbott, [1955] 2 All E.R. 899, 901 (C.C.A.).
42. See note 17supra.
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case 43 presents a variation of the problem. A businessman and his secretary
were jointly tried for receiving money under false pretenses. The prosecutor
proved the secretary actually received the money but failed to link her
employer to the crime. After the employer's motion for acquittal was
erroneously denied, both defendants testified. The secretary, presenting the
only defense open to her, testified that she had received the money at the
instance of her employer and with no intent to defraud. This testimony con-
nected the employer to the crime and enabled the jury to convict both de-
fendants. The appellate court considered the evidence at the time the motion
was made and found it insufficient. Rejecting the waiver doctrine on the
ground that the defendant had a right to have the charge dismissed as soon as
the prosecution's case was found deficient, the court refused to consider the
defendant's evidence and reversed the conviction.44
Why should a court which presumably is interested in increasing the pre-
cision of the criminal process-convicting the guilty and acquitting the inno-
cent 45 -ever reverse the conviction of a defendant whose guilt, on the whole
record, is quite apparent? A reversal in such a case decreases the precision of
the process to the extent that an obviously guilty defendant is acquitted. This
result, however, is justified if the general rule which requires acquittal in
such a case has the effect of increasing the overall precision of the process.
In the long run an inquisitorial system--one which relies primarily upon
interrogation of the accused to determine guilt 4 6 -is far less precise than an
accusatorial system--one in which the accuser must prove guilt without in-
terrogation of the accused.47 This is so for a variety of reasons, primary among
which is the highly questionable evidentiary value of the confession in general
43. Regina v. Abbott, [1955] 2 All E.R. 899 (C.C.A.).
44. Id. at 903. ("It was the prisoner's right to say that the case against him had col-
lapsed, and that he was not called upon to answer"). Recognition by American courts of the
need for dismissal at the first point in the trial where the failure of proof becomes obvious
is found in cases which say dismissal at the close of the prosecutor's statement is on occasion
appropriate. See United States v. Maryland Cooperative Milk Producers, 145 F. Supp.
151 (D.D.C. 1956) (dictum) ; McGuire v. United States, 152 F.2d 577, 580 (8th Cir. 1945)
(dictum) ; State v. Karcher, 155 Ohio 253, 256, 98 N.E.2d 308, 310 (1951) (dictum).
45. If the court is to effectuate the multiple ends of the criminal law-isolation,
rehabilitation and deterrence-it must assume the dual responsibility of acquitting the
innocent as well as convicting the guility. For every innocent man convicted there may well
be a guilty man at large. Isolation is thus thwarted, deterrence is diminished and resources
for rehabilitation are likely to be wasted. See generally Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal
Procedural Revision, 51 YALE L.J. 723, 733-34 (1942).
46. For a description of the inquisitorial system and its development in France, see
HOWARD, CRIItNAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 383-85 (1931).
47. Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system. . . . Under our
system society carries the burden of proving its charge against the accused not out
of his own mouth. It must establish its case, not by interrogation of the accused even
under judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently secured through skillful
investigation.
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (opinion of Frankfurther, J.).
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and the compulsory confession in particular.48 The long and unpleasant history
of the inquisitorial system dictated its rejection by the founding fathers in
favor of the accusatorial system.40 Any rule which encourages the prosecutor
to prove guilt through the mouth of the accused and not through extrinsic
evidence, however, undermines the accusatorial system and thereby reduces
the precision of the process. The requirement that no case be brought unless
the prosecutor can prove guilt extrinsically, without relying upon the accused,
is inexorably interwoven into the accusatorial system and promotes the highest
possible degree of precision in the system.
Entirely aside from a concern for the precision of the system, American
courts sometimes free obviously guilty defendants in order to protect other
values. For example, many courts exclude illegally obtained evidence not
because the admission of such evidence would generally reduce precision, but
solely to deter prosecutional officials from violating the right of privacy
guaranteed by the fourth amendment.50 Similarly, contemporary society rec-
48. Many confessions are the product of at least psychological compulsion since
it is the stock-in-trade of the police investigator. See O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION 99 (1956) ; DIENSTEIN, TECHNICS FOR THE CRIME INVESTIGATOR 100 (1952).
The inherently coercive nature of police interrogation sometimes has been a factor where
courts have held a confession to be involuntary. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143
(1944).
Moreover, students of human behavior have thrown considerable doubt on the reliability
of completely voluntary confessions. See FREUD, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE ASCERTAIN-
MENT OF TRUTH IN COURTS OF LAW 23, COLLECTED WORKS, Vol. II (1956). REiK, THE
COMPULSION TO CONFESS 259-62, 265-66 (1959); ALEXANDER & STAUB, THE CRIMINAL,
THE JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC 94-95, 139-49 (1956). Cf. DOSTEYEVSKY, THE BROTHERS
KARAMAZOV 757 (Mod. Lib. ed.)
49. This is manifested by various provisions of the Bill of Rights. The fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination negates completely reliance on inquisition. Furthermore,
the right to confrontation and compulsory process guaranteed by the sixth amendment and
the right to bail provided for in the eighth amendment are all inconsistent with the inquist-
torial system. See HowARD, note 46 supra.
50. If letters and private documents can thus be seized [without a warrant for search
or arrest] and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment ... might as well be stricken from the Con-
stitution....
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). The fourteenth amendment, however,
does not preclude the use of illegally obtained evidence in state courts. Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949), although illegally seized evidence obtained by state officers is no longer
admissible in a federal court. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). The "exclusion-
ary rule" is gaining ground in state courts. See Table I, Appendix to Elkins v. United States,
supra, many of which are motivated by the same factors which led to the Weeks decision.
See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
We have been compelled [to hold such evidence inadmissible] because other remedies
have completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions on
the part of police officers with the attendant result that the courts under the old rule
have been constantly required to participate in, and in effect condone, the lawless
activities of law enforcement officials.
Id. at 445, 282 P.2d at 911-12.
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ognizes as a separate value the right of an individual, whether guilty or inno-
cent, not to be inconvenienced and stigmatized by a criminal prosecution "
unless the prosecutor has, at the time of the trial, sufficient independent evi-
dence of guilt to carry his case to the jury. Vigorous enforcement of de-
fendant's right to immediate acquittal as soon as it is apparent that this burden
has not been met might deter the reckless or malicious prosecutor from institut-
ing a criminal proceeding on less than adequate evidence. But the waiver
doctrine which effectively precludes appellate review of the denial of de-
fendant's motion for acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case has the
reverse effect. It actually encourages the prosecutor to bring a proceeding
without adequate independent evidence of guilt in the hope of compelling the
accused to testify and fill the evidentiary gaps.
The denial of a motion for acquittal at the close of the state's case-in-chief
exerts considerable compulsion on the defendant to testify. Under the waiver
doctrine, the defendant must choose either to rest in order to secure appellate
review of the motion or to present a defense. As previously outlined, 2 resting
is hazardous at best. Often, therefore, the accused will offer a defense in the
hope of securing an acquittal by the jury. Yet a defendant stands little chance
of acquittal unless he testifies.5 3 Some complusion to take the witness stand
is present, therefore, even when the motion for acquittal is properly denied.
Complusion in that case, however, occurs after the prosecution has proved
guilt by independant evidence. Adamson v. California 5 4 held that a state
prosecutor could add to this compulsion by commenting if the accused fails to
testify.55 In Adamson, however, the state had presented sufficient extrinsic
evidence of guilt to carry the case to the jury 6 before compulsion occurred
and, therefore, there was no possibility that the defendant's testimony would
supply a deficiency in the state's case. But where a motion for acquittal is
erroneously denied, the compulsion to testify is exerted before the prosecution
has proven guilt. Even worse, the waiver doctrine sanctions the use of defense
evidence, evidence which would not have been presented but for the erroneous
51. "I must say that, as a litigant, I should dread a law suit beyond almost anything
short of sickness or death." Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the
Matter, 3 LcuREs oN LEGAL Topics 89, 105 (1926). Cannot it be assumed that the strain
is compounded for a criminal defendant? The certainty and degree of moral opprobrium,
of course, will vary with the offense and the community in which it is committed.
52. See notes 15, 16 and 17 supra and accompanying text.
53. See note 13 supra.
54. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
55. Most observers believe the jury will draw inferences unfavorable to the accused
even without comment by prosecutor or judge on his failure to testify. See WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 2272, 2273 (3d ed. 1940) ; Bruce, The Right to Comment on the Failure of the
Defendant to Testify, 31 MIca. L. REv. 226 (1932) ; Note, 25 FORDHAm L. REv. 381 (1956) ;
Comment, 6 DE PAUL L. REv. 83 (1956). Six states permit comment on the defendant's
failure to take the stand: New Jersey, Ohio, Vermont, Connecticut, Iowa and California.
56. 332 U.S. 46, 52 (1947).
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ruling, to support the defendant's conviction. As the New Jersey court noted in
rejecting the doctrine,57 this comes "perilously near compelling the accused to
convict himself."' 8 Whether or not compulsion to testify under these circum-
stances-before the state has met its burden-technically contravenes the
privilege against self-incrimination, 9 it is certainly offensive to its spirit and
to the fundamental precept that the prosecutor must prove his case by evidence
"independently secured."'60
Erroneous denial of a motion for acquittal at the close of the prosecution's
case is encouraged by a variety of factors in the present system. There is
seldom appellate review of judgments of acquittal because in most jurisdictions
the state cannot appeal.01 Consequently, trial judges know that they bear the
ultimate responsibility if prosecutions are terminated midway in the trial.
Furthermore, they are aware that they will probably have two subsequent
opportunities to review denial of the motion for acquittal-when the motion
is renewed at the close of all the evidence, and when the defendant seeks judg-
ment n.o.v. 2 This naturally tends to increase the reluctance to grant a non-
reviewable acquittal before all available evidence is in the record. Moreover,
judges' institutional familiarity with prosecutors and their deference toward
public officials attempting to perform their duty may militate against early
dismissals.
03
57. State v. Bacheller, 89 N.J.L. 433, 98 Atl. 829 (1916).
58. Id. at 436, 98 Atl. at 830.
59. U.S. CONST., amend. V. All but two state constitutions have analogous provisions.
8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENcE § 2252 (3d ed. 1940).
60. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949).
61. Only three states allow the state to appeal from an acquittal: Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-96 (1958), State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 Atl. 1110 (1894) ; Vermont,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7403 (1958), State v. Felch, 92 Vt. 477, 105 Atl. 23 (1918);
Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 958.12(d) (1958), State v. Witte, 243 Wis. 423, 10 N.W.2d
117 (1943), although the trial orders that may be appealed by the state vary considerably.
Compare 18 U.S.C. 373 (1951) (United States may appeal from a decision dismissing an
indictment or information and from a decision arresting judgment) with CAL. PEN. CODE §
1238 (state may appeal from an order dismissing an indictment or information, from an
order granting a new trial, from an order made after judgment affecting the substantial
rights of the state and from an order modifying the verdict or reducing the degree of the
offense or the punishment imposed.
62. See, e.g., FED. . ClM. P.29(b).
63. The empathy between the judge and prosecutor was greater during the early period
of the common law and was in part responsible for the development of trial by jury.
Our law has wisely placed this strong and twofold barrier, of a presentment [by
grand jury] and a trial by jury, between the liberties of the people and the prerogatives
of the crown.
IV BLACXSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 350 (Jones ed. 1916). See also Taft, The Administration
of Criminal Law, 15 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1905) ; PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CoM-
M.sON LAw 127 (4th ed. 1948) (juries occasionally punished for acquitting defendant in a
political trial). But see ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 408-13
(1947).
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As presently administered, the motion for acquittal at the close of the
government's case-in-chief is ineffectual. The mechanics of the present pro-
cedural system lead trial judges to deny the motion and defendants to go
forward with their evidence."4 If the motion is to fulfill its function of early
dismissal of prosecutions based on insufficient evidence, there must be appellate
supervision of the motion's denial. In almost every jurisdiction, however,
the waiver doctrine precludes review. 65 Despite the near universal acceptance
of the doctrine, there are very few cases or commentators that have discussed
its policy basis. The arguments made on its behalf are unconvincing. Some
courts have called the error "harmless" where the accused discloses incriminat-
ing facts.66 Since such testimony would not have been presented had there
been no error, it can be labeled harmless only if it is assumed that all errors
are harmless where the defendant appears guilty to the appellate court. This,
however, has never been the rule. Other courts have said that the error is
waived because the defendant could have rested and since he "voluntarily"
offered his proof, he has no complaint.67 Since the defendant has almost no
chance of an acquittal by the jury if he remains silent after the government
rests,68 and since he has little assurance of appellate reversal,6 9 it is deceptive
to say that the defendant proceeds voluntarily. Two other factors not articu-
lated in the opinions probably underlie the doctrine. First, the waiver doctrine
was already familiar in the civil context before it became a part of the criminal
process and it was borrowed without the benefit of real analysis, 70 and, second,
appellate courts motivated by a desire to increase the precision of the process
are reluctant to discharge a defendant whose guilt is apparent on the whole
record. But the recognized differences between the criminal and the civil
process require that any interchange of procedural rules be accompanied by
64. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
65. See note 9 supra.
66. United States v. Goldstein, 168 F.2d 666, 670 (2d Cir. 1948) ("[H]e cannot take
advantage of an error [in denying his motion] if he makes that error harmless.") ; People
v. Crane, 34 Cal. App. 760, 765, 168 Pac. 1055, 1057 (1917) ("[T]he court erred in denying
appellant's motion ... and such error is reversible .... But the required evidence was
thereafter supplied by the defendant himself, and we cannot say, therefore... that defendant
was prejudiced in said ruling.").
67. Leyer v. United States, 183 Fed. 102, 104 (2d Cir. 1910) ("[I]t is immaterial that
evidence essential to conviction was voluntarily introduced by the defendant himself....
Defendant was not compelled to go forward .... [H]e could quite safely rest upon his
exception .... ").
68. See note 13 supra.
69. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
70. State v. Goldstein, 168 F.2d 666, 670 (2d Cir. 1948) ("What was said in Bogk v.
Cassert [149 U.S. 17 (1893)] [a civil case] . . . is equally applicable now.") ; Leyer v.
United States, 183 Fed. 102, 104 (2d Cir. 1910) ("It is well-settled . . . that an exception to
a refusal to direct a verdict.., is waived, if defendant thereafter proceeds to put in proof."
[citing civil case]) ; State v. Meadows, 330 Mo. 1020, 1026, 51 S.W.2d 1033, 1036 (1932)
("we see no reason why the rule that applies generally should not be applied here").
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careful analysis. And as previously demonstrated, acquittal of the guilty in
any given case may, by insuring the efficacy of the accusatorial system, in-
crease the overall precision of the criminal process.71 Moreover, the abolition
of the waiver doctrine and the resultant supervision over motions to acquit
would maximize the societal value of not having prosecutions brought without
sufficient independent evidence of guilt.
Collateral support for the abolition of the waiver doctrine can be found in
Jackson v. United States.72 The court held that a defendant who moved for
acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case had a right to a ruling on this
motion before he elected whether or not to present a defense; it therefore
reversed an attempt by the trial judge to reserve decision on the motion until
both sides had rested. The reversal was grounded on the court's interpretation
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 73 and its belief that the motion for
acquittal "would be a futile thing if the court could reserve its ruling and
force the defendant to an election between resting and being deprived of the
benefit of the motion." 74 This decision necessarily implies that the motion for
acquittal should be granted if the evidence against the accused is insufficient
at the time the motion is inade. Paradoxically, however, the Jackson court
also reaffirmed the waiver doctrine,75 failing to recognize that it allows the
trial court effectively to "reserve" its decision by denying the motion.
If trial judges are to decide motions for acquittal made at the close
of the state's case-in-chief in a fully disinterested manner, it may be necessary
to balance the prospects of appeal from the granting and denial of such
motions. When, as is generally true today, appeal can be taken if the motion is
denied but not if it is granted,76 an extraneous factor is injected into the
decisional process. Some judges may react to the disparity in appeal potential
by automatically deciding close questions in favor of the accused, thereby
avoiding the possibility of reversal. 77 Others, realizing that the accused but
not the state can appeal an erroneous ruling, may always deny the motion
because they do not want to assume sole responsibility for terminating the
prosecution with finality midway through the trial.78 Even though most judges
71. See text at notes 44, 45 supra.
72. 250 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1958).
73. Id. at 901.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid. ("The introduction of evidence after the denial of a motion made at the
close of the prosecution's case waives any error in the denial of the motion.").
76. See note 60 supra.
77. See note 60 supra and accompanying text. Most commentators favor state appeal.
See generally Mayers & Yarbrough, Bis Vexari, New Trials and Successive Prosecutions,
74 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1960) ; Miller, Appeals by the State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J.
486 (1927); Note, 45 Ky. L.J. 628 (1957); Note, 66 YALE L.J. 592 (1957); Note, 47
YALE L.J. 489 (1938). See also Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 339 (1956).
78. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
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may be expected to withstand the procedural pressure exerted by the general
inability of the state to appeal if the motion for acquittal is granted, that factor
remains a latent source of error. It might therefore be advisable to grant the
prosecution the right to appeal from a judgment of acquittal rendered at the
close of its case-in-chief.
Opposition to government appeal has centered around its double jeopardy
aspects, the possible added burden on the defendant, and the possibility of
weakening the jury as a barrier between the state and the accused.71 Although
the fifth amendment bars government appeal in the federal courts,80 no similar
restriction is placed upon the states by the fourteenth amendment. 1 Three
states presently allow government appeal from all acquittals.8 2 Other state con-
stitutions might be construed to allow government appeal from acquittals.
3
The burden on criminal defendants generally might actually be lessened by
government appeal. Not only does experience show that government appeals
are rare even when permissible, 84 but a more effective motion for acquittal,
which presumably would result from government appeal, might save many
defendants from being indicted and still others from bearing the burden of
making a defense. When the state is successful, of course, the defendant would
have to endure a second trial, but this is hardly worse than having to proceed
with the trial after a motion for acquittal has been erroneously denied. More-
79. See generally The Right of the State to Appeal Criminal Cases, 9 RUTGERS L. R v.
545, 553 (1955) ; ORrIELD, CRIMINAL APPEAL IN AMERICA 71 (1939).
80. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), recently re-affirmed by Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
81. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), upheld a Connecticut statute allowing
appeal by the state. Other cases indicate that although there may be some due process limita-
tions on successive prosecutions, they do not result from any incorporation of the double
jeopardy provisions of the fifth amendment. See Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424
(1953) (no denial of due process by a second trial after mistrial declared on motion of prose-
cutor) ; Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958) (a majority of the court, by implication, said
that where successive prosecutions amount to harassment, there is a violation of due process.)
82. See note 61 supra.
83. Wisconsin, one of the three jurisdictions which allows the state to appeal on
acquittal, note 61 supra, has a constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, Wis.
CoNsT. art. I, § 8, but State v. Witte, 243 Wis. 423, 10 N.W.2d 117 (1943) held that a retrial
after successful appeal by the state was not double jeopardy. The court followed the rationale
of Justice Holmes' dissent in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904), and
reasoned that the accused was in "continuing jeopardy" until completion of a trial free of
error. But see People v. Hill, 146 Cal. 145, 79 Pac. 845 (1905) ; People v. Horn, 70 Cal. 17,
11 Pac. 470 (1886).
84. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPE-is IN AMERICA 63 (1939); See also Mayers & Yar-
brough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 H~Av. L. REv. 1, 9 (1960),
who point out that Connecticut requires the prosecution to request appeal at the time of the
acquittal. CoNx. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-96 (1958) requires the trial court's permission in
order for the prosecutor to appeal.
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over, the burden of securing appellate reversal will now be on the government.
So far as the integrity of the jury is concerned, allowing government appeal
from a judicial acquittal can only result, if the state is successful, in the case
eventually going to a jury-hardly a weakening of the barrier.
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